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Lessons Learned from the Farm Debt Crisis of the 1980's*
—  by Neil E. Harl**
Society would be well served if the lessons learned in the farm crisis of 
the 1980's could be identified and memorialized to assure ready access on the 
occasion of the next major economic downturn in agriculture. Without much doubt, 
the sector will once again experience the trauma of the 1980's sometime in the 
twenty-first century. It is not known when a farm crisis will re-emerge, whether 
in 2035, 2040 or 2050. But it is likely to occur when memories —  and warnings 
handed down to succeeding generations —  have faded and the galaxy of economic 
conditions is positioned to create a sense of euphoria among farm decision 
makers.
I. The General Setting
It is not new for agriculture to be subjected to rapid economic and social
change. Over time, agriculture has adjusted to conditions of greater efficiency
with a steady decline in the percentage of the population and the percentage of
the capital stock needed to produce needed food and fiber products. The decline
has been especially marked since the 1930's as developments in plant and animal
breeding and machinery and chemical usage, and improvements in the level of
management ability of farmers, have combined to cause an acceleration in the
movement of labor out of the sector. Agriculture has truly been a development
sector as the industry has "downsized" itself in relative terms, freeing labor
and capital for use in the non-farm economy. The development occurring in
agriculture has been beneficial to the general economy, permitting the
reallocation of resources to a burgeoning service sector, high technology
manufacturing and product development and other sectors and subsectors.
"'Presented at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, as the W. I. Myers Memorial 
Lecture, October 19, 1988.
**Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor in Agriculture and Professor of 
Economics, Iowa State University; Member of the Iowa Bar.
2The debt problem
What has occurred in agriculture in the past five years in terms of firms 
failing because equity was exhausted or operating credit was denied has had 
little to do with efficiency, however. In fact, many of the firms at risk have 
been among the most efficient in the industry. The distinguishing feature has 
been the amount of debt held which has been excessive as measured by the economic 
environment of the 1980fs.
The amount of debt in U.S. agriculture increased dramatically after 1950 as 
shown in Figure 1. Total farm debt outstanding in 1950 totalled $11.2 billion, 
rising to over $216 billion nationally in 1983, before commencing a decline in 
1984 as some debt has been paid off or discharged otherwise and as the economic 
environment has discouraged the contracting of new debt. Total debt stood at 
about $188 billion at the end of 1986 and dropped to about $158 billion at the 
end of 1987 (including CCC debt).
Figure 1. Net Farm Income and Debt.
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3Extent of financial stress
As of January, 1987, nearly 22 percent of the farmers nationally had debt- 
to-asset ratios of greater than 40 percent and were responsible for more than 67
percent of the farm debt.
Table 1. Percentage of Farms and Debt to Asset Ratio for Each Region and 
for the United States, January, 1987.
Debt to Asset Ratio
41-70 71-100 Over 100
Farms Assets Debt Farms Assets —  —  ----— Debt Farms Assets Debt-- --H-- ---a-- --a—
Northeast 10.9 7.6 33.8 a. a. a a a
Lake States 18.1 20.6 34.9 8.4 9.4 24.7 5.1 3.8 17.2
Corn Belt 13.9 17.4 34.3 6.5 6.1 18.8 5.0 3.8 17.2
Northern Plains 20.2 19.7 34.4 8.0 8.1 22.2 4.7 2.6 13.3
Appalachian 8.0 7.1 33.2 2.0 1.8 13.7 1.9 0.7 7.7
Southeast 10.6 12.9 29.7 1.6 9.2 33.4 4.6 1.3 11.9
Delta States 9.4 10.7 26.8 4.5 4.9 18.7 5.4 2.1 19.0
Southern Plains 10.7 9.4 35.2 3.0 1.6 9.1 2.5 1.6 20.1
Mountain States 11.5 14.7 35.0 4.2 3.9 14.1 3.5 1.6 10.4
Pacific States 10.4 34.0 34.9 4.2 5.0 18.3 2.4 0.7 7.1
United States 13.0 14.1 34.0 5.0 5.1 19.2 3.7 2.0 13.9
Source: Financial Characteristics of U.S. Farms, January 1, 1987, Agr. Inf. 
Bull. No. 525, Econ. Res. Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 
August, 1987, App. Tables 30, 33. 
aData insufficient for disclosure.
In terms of both income and solvency, USDA classifies farms into four 
groups —
Favorable (debt to asset ratios of 0.40 or less and positive income) 
Marginal income (debt to asset ratios of 0.40 or less and negative income) 
Marginal solvency (debt to asset ratios of more than 0.40 and positive 
income)
Vulnerable (debt to asset ratios of more than 0.40 and negative income) 
Table 2 shows the distribution of operators, assets and debt among the four
classes.
4Table 2. Distribution of Operators and Debt by USDA Classification.
Marginal Marginal
Favorable Income Solvency
Operators 47.41 30.96 11.12
Debt 22.66 10.27 32.06
Source: Financial Characteristics of U,S, Farms, January 1, 1987, Agr. Inf.
Bull. No. 525, Econ. Res. Service, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, August,
1987, Table 11.
The impact of debtor distress on lenders has been substantial. In 1985, the
Farm Credit System incurred a $2.7 billion loss, the largest one-year loss of any
U.S. financial institution. The loss for 1986 totalled $1.9 billion. With the 
help of creative accounting, the loss was reduced to $17 million in 1987.
A total of 68 agricultural banks failed in 1986 out of a total of 138 failed 
banks. The numbers of agricultural bank failures declined to 58 in 1987 while 
the total number of failed banks rose to 184 (plus 19 banks that received FDIC 
assistance and remained open).
The massive reduction in farm debt in the 1980's is the most visible feature 
of the farm debt crisis. That phenomenon dramatized the resilience of the 
financial system in dealing with excess debt and provided new insights into the 
economic and social disruptions that almost certainly accompany such an event. 
Hopefully, lessons have been learned as to —  Cl) how to prevent such a period 
from reoccurring and (2) how to cope with the trauma if indeed it were to recur.
II. Key lessons learned in the 1980's1 
The danger in aberrational conditions
The first lesson —  and perhaps the most significant —  is the critical 
importance of spotting aberrational conditions and discounting their long-term 
relevance. Years ago, my father used to say, "If you see something that's too 
good to be true, it probably is," Decision makers can be lulled into economic 
complacency and confidence by forces that appear permanent but are clearly not
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5sustainable.
Obviously, this lesson was forgotten in the 1970's as inflation was allowed 
to rage at elevated levels long enough to give individuals the belief that 
inflation would always be with us. But the lesson is far broader than inflation 
in the 1970's. The same factor was at work in the 1980's as investors in fixed 
income securities came to believe that 16 percent interest on an insured basis 
was the permanent condition of the human family. That was no more sustainable 
than the inflationary era of the 1970's.
The lesson is also important for agriculture any time the demand for food 
products is temporarily elevated, as in war time.
There lies buried deep in every psyche the persistent belief that the future 
somehow holds only good economic news; that the bad old days won't return. For 
decades, I heard my father wax eloquent about the 1930's. Indeed, I could even 
remember the last half of that decade. But deep down I doubted that agriculture 
would ever be subjected to such punishment again. We had become clever enough to 
sidestep such problems and to avoid the trauma of another decade of foreclosures, 
bankruptcies and deep debtor distress. Clearly, that was not the case.
Indeed, for agriculture it's well to keep in mind that the nature of the 
sector assures that, long-term, product prices will fluctuate near the cost of 
production on marginal lands. If profits rise, farmers as good economic citizens 
expand production. That brings price down as supply increases. Similarly, if 
losses occur, some farmers cut back on production so price will rise as supply 
falls. Therefore, in any era (as in 1972-73), when farm prices rise sharply, the 
message should be clear: it is aberrational; take advantage of the better times
but beware of making investments on the assumption that the better times will 
continue. The capacity of agriculture to expand production is absolutely 
awesome. Moreover, it's well to keep in mind that increases in profitability are
6likely to be capitalized quickly into land values.
How can we be sure that this lesson is learned and relearned every 
generation? Relearning that lesson periodically helps to guard against the kind 
of economic downturn experienced in agriculture in the 1980’s. For if the lesson 
is not learned, the agricultural sector is almost certain to experience periods 
of major economic trauma.
This problem is compounded by the fact that society seems to have a bias in 
favor of good news. The bearer of bad news or of caution is rarely appreciated 
in any era and is especially unwelcome in good times. As an example, during the 
boom times of the 1970's, I can recall no instance when administrators at Iowa 
State University were told that the work being done in research and in extension 
was driving up land values, adding to feelings of economic buoyancy. But I can 
say that as soon as highly visible efforts were mounted to address the farm debt 
crisis of the 1980's, delegations were pounding on the dean’s desk demanding that 
those wild-eyed agricultural economists be curbed — they were driving down land 
values.
If indeed it is correct, that society’s preference for good news creates a 
bias against research and extension work that identifies the aberrational and 
magnifies the perceived risks emanating from the aberrational, society should 
make a concerted effort to commission scholars to take the long view and to keep 
before decision-makers the downside risks from non-sustainable conditions. 
Agriculture, and indeed all of society, would be well served with such advice and 
counsel.
Capacity of creditors to broker losses
Perhaps the second most important lesson of the farm crisis of the 1980's
2has been that creditors have an enormous capacity to "broker" losses. Just as 
rivers have a large capacity to deal with biodegradable pollutants, given time,
7distance and oxygen content in the water, creditors have a great capacity to 
absorb losses given time and the presence of some borrowers who are not in 
financial difficulty.
The loss sharing process. In the 1980's, as collateral values plummeted and *•
cash flows proved to be inadequate to meet loan commitments, creditors were 
thrust into the unaccustomed role of "brokering losses."
Losses from interest payments missed and principal payments not made, and 
losses suffered when collateral values were well below principal balances when 
loans were liquidated, were shared among several parties in the adjustment 
process — ■ (1) the borrower who was in default and unable to make payments,
(2) the lender, (3) other borrowers not in financial difficulty and (4) the 
federal government.
• The sharing of losses by the borrower and the lender are traditionally 
straightforward and are to be expected. After a borrower defaults on loan 
obligations, the borrower nearly always loses all assets other than assets exempt 
from execution. This happens in the event of default in good times; it also 
happens if default occurs in a time of widespread economic stress.
In normal times, the lender loses to the extent collateral values are less 
than the remaining amount owed after liquidating all of the borrower’s non-exempt 
assets.
But in times of widespread economic stress, the loss sharing process does 
not stop with the borrower and the lender. Others are touched by losses being 
suffered. The expansion of loss sharing is partly because the rules of loss 
sharing are modified legislatively and partly because of economic circumstances 
that permit losses to be passed on to other customers.
• Borrowers not in financial jeopardy contribute to the loss sharing 
process as interest rates are elevated to cover loan losses and to reflect
8diminished lending competition in rural areas. In the 1970's, had there been a 
half percentage point difference in interest rates among lenders in a rural 
community, borrowers would have flocked across town over lunch to the cheapest 
source of money. - In the 1980's, most farmers considered themselves lucky to have 
one source of money, not multiple sources. Few lenders wanted to increase their 
exposure to agricultural lending. Many lenders were willing to maintain their 
exposure for long standing, credit-worthy customers but were not enthusiastic 
about taking on new risks. Moreover, during the 1980's, the Farm Credit System 
was laboring under high cost bonds issued in the late 1970's and early 1980's 
without a call provision and was rapidly downsizing its loan portfolio as good, 
credit-worthy borrowers fled the system and as an effort was made to contain 
system losses. Moreover, FmHA was under strong pressure within the 
administration to limit lending, especially direct loans.
The result appears to have been that the "price surface" for loanable funds 
remained several basis points above where the interest rate would have been in 
normal times. Thus, borrowers not in financial difficulty ended up paying a 
premium for borrowed funds. Fart of the interest bill for financially sound 
borrowers was to help defray the costs linked to losses being suffered by the 
lender. Indeed, it was recognized during the 1980's that —  (1) borrowers who 
were sufficiently strong credit risks to be able to move completely outside 
agricultural lending could obtain funds at lower cost and (2) lenders in 
agricultural areas with little or no exposure to farm loan losses were earning 
record or near record profits as they were able to take advantage of the elevated 
interest rate structure without the attendant losses.
® The federal government also participated in the loss sharing process  ^
directly and indirectly in three significant ways —  (1) the federal government, 
through FmHA, made good on loan guarantees as part of the federal loan guarantee
9programs, (2) lender losses were translated into reduced federal (and state) 
income tax liability with the government bearing a portion of the burden for loan 
losses by lenders doing well enough economically to be paying income tax and 
(3) federal farm subsidy payments rose to record levels in 1985 and 1986 and 
contributed immensely to the loss sharing process. As to the latter point, it 
appears that Congress, for various reasons, chose not to fund a major 
targeted intervention effort for financially troubled farm debtors. Rather, the 
Congress elected to maintain commodity price support programs at a more generous 
level than would likely have been the case otherwise. Informal estimates of 
additional federal funding of $10 billion under the price support program because 
of the farm debt problem do not appear to be unreasonable* That approach was not 
a very efficient way to deal with the farm debt problem, with approximately 60 
percent of the payment amount going to farmers not experiencing financial 
difficulty. But the benefits from the flow of price and income support program 
funds into rural areas at the depth of the farm crisis cannot be overemphasized.
The contribution of the federal government to the loss sharing process 
through commodity price support payments weakened substantially the critical and 
self-righteous comments of those who were able to survive the farm crisis by dint 
of hard work and scrimping. Those comments were mostly directed to those who had 
debt forgiven in bankruptcy or otherwise. Without federal commodity price 
support benefits, a far larger segment of farm debtors would have been unable to 
meet their payment obligations. Moreover, without commodity price support 
benefits, lenders would have been far less successful in coping with loan 
losses.
Indeed, there was little room left for self-righteous and critical comments
4even though such comments were occasionally heard. Everyone in agriculture —  
borrowers and non-borrowers alike,*■ lenders and those selling inputs— all
10
benefitted;from the added income from the generous commodity price support 
programs.
Thus, unless losses came too quickly or in too large an amount, lenders were 
successful in "brokering" them to several participants in the process. If losses 
did come too quickly or in too large an amount, lenders failed. One of the 
important lessons of the 1980's was that loan losses can be successfully brokered 
if spread over enough years. What lenders cannot endure are massive defaults 
that provide no opportunity for sharing the losses with others,
A similar process seems to have been at work with respect to losses suffered 
in the first instance by input suppliers. Modest losses appear to have been 
passed along to customers as part of the cost of doing business. Again, the 
government commodity price support programs were helpful in maintaining a higher 
level of economic buoyancy in rural communities which was helpful as , losses were 
shared.
This "socialization" of losses is, to a degree, inconsistent with the 
traditional view that borrowers unable to repay principal plus interest suffer 
the consequences. The circumstances of the 1980's assured that the costs of the 
loan default were not —  and could not —  be limited to the borrower and the 
lender. Other participants were necessarily and inescapably involved because of 
the nature and magnitude of the problem.
Rules governing loss sharing. From the beginning of recorded history, the 
legal system has furnished the rules governing remedies upon borrower default.
The rights of creditors have been spelled out in the legal system. The 
traditional creditors' remedies have included mortgage foreclosure and forfeiture 
of installment contracts with Uniform Commercial Code default procedures added in 
more recent time. Debtors have never been totally without rights, however, and 
in the modern era have been eligible for bankruptcy with discharge of debt. In
11
the 1930’s, 28 states enacted statutes providing for moratoria on farm real 
estate mortgage foreclosure. In the 1980's, the moratorium received relatively 
less attention, perhaps because of the impact on lenders and on lending and the 
realization that other intervention approaches could be fashioned to better 
achieve relief for debtors.
It should be emphasized, however, that loss sharing would have occurred in . 
the 1980's had there been no modification in the legal framework governing 
default.
The necessity to restructure debt -
; The third important lesson from the 1980's was that in the face, of serious 
and widespread economic difficulty, the restructuring of debt -- including 
stretching out principal payments, reducing interest rates and even forgiving 
principal —  may be far preferable for the debtor, for the lender and for society 
generally than to. insist that obligations be paid in full.
Resistance to debt restructuring understandably comes from creditors. But 
it also comes from some who are not directly affected. In the latter group, 
there seems to be a feeling that it is somehow unethical for society to let a 
debtor off the hook with less than full payment of what is owed.
What should not be forgotten in all of this is that bankruptcy is a 
well-established, constitutionally-assured bottom line solution for debtors. As 
much as some might like to resurrect them, debtor's prisons and the drawing and 
quartering ..of debtors are both unlikely to make a comeback. Therefore, when 
debtor distress is widespread and serious, it makes little sense to insist that 
debts' be paid-,..when the obligations most assuredly will not be met. As the debtor 
approaches insolvency, it makes eminent sense to take steps to keep loans 
performing rather: than to force liquidation, displacing the farm family, 
triggering tax liability on the liquidation and incurring significant liquidation
12
costs. Thus, any time the long term recovery for creditors with restructuring is 
greater in present value terms than liquidation, restructuring is economically 
advisable.
As the farm debt crisis of the 1980's progressed, the wisdom of
restructuring became clearer and more obvious. Initially, the attention was
focused on restructuring with the inducement of loan guarantees by the federal 
5government. By mid 1985, some lenders, notably commercial banks in the middle 
west, had concluded that restructuring should be undertaken whenever it was in 
the lender's best interest. The conflict posed by some lenders subscribing to 
loan restructuring and others steadfastly refusing even where it was clearly in 
the lender's best interest to do So led to three significant developments. All 
three were designed to produce a rational outcome for borrower and lender, taking 
into account the economic circumstances.
• Mandatory mediation, enacted in Iowa and Minnesota and considered in 
several other states, was a rational (but not costless) procedure to force the 
parties to examine all sides of the issue and, hopefully, reach agreement on a 
rational outcome.
6• Chapter 12 bankruptcy, effective November 26, 1986, was designed to
enable eligible farm debtors to write down debt to collateral value to make the 
7debtor stable. Thus, Chapter 12 bankruptcy was a form of enforced debt
restructuring with the process activated by debtor action. Under Chapter 12
bankruptcy, the amount of debt above collateral value is treated as unsecured
debt which is discharged if not paid during the three to five year period: covered
by the bankruptcy reorganization plan. Under a typical Chapter 12 plan, less
8than 10 percent of the unsecured debt is paid.
Arguably, Chapter 12 does not increase the loss taken by lenders but it 
does —  (!) possibly require that the loss be recognized sooner than the lender
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or the lender's examiners would have required, (2) preclude the lender from 
recovering more if the borrower's economic position improves (either because of 
better fortunes for agriculture or because Aunt Lillian dies) and (3) cause the 
lender to lose some of the control traditionally held over the 
default-liquidation process.
Although the amount of use of Chapter 12 has been substantial, as noted in 
Table 1, the influence of Chapter 12 goes well beyond the number of filings.
Table 1, Number of Chapter 12 Filings in the North Central Region Since 
November 26, 1986
----------------------------- Nurrber As Of--------- ---------------
1-31-87 3-31-87 5-31-87 7-31-87 9-30-87 11-30-87 1-31-88 3-31-88 5-31-88 7-31-88 9-30-88
IL 46 121 179 233 250 282 301 329 350 369 373
IN 30 74 153 199 216 292 322 339 351 365 376
IA 73 188 264 290 308 329 350 360 379 387 396
KS 59 102 139 210 244 275 299 312 323 334 342
MI 18 48 87 137 148 166 181 194 216 220 232
m 46 69 91 120 126 142 154 155 168 173 180
m 18 109 172 206 225 246 281 298 332 350 361
NB 96 220 409 491 556 578 626 674 704 722 741
ND 25 51 74 87 113 140 167 179 188 202 209
OH 23 87 142 163 187 203 227 243 267 272* 272*
SD 106 208 315 438 512 410 502 525 544 552 560
WI 38 89 129 154 179 199 213 226 241 250 258
578 1,366 2,154 2,728 3,064 3,262 3,623 3,834 4,063 4,196 4,300
*Through 6-30-88 only.
The availability of Chapter 12 has encouraged creditors to negotiate debt 
restructuring arrangements outside bankruptcy. Indeed, the major negotiating 
task is often the task of deciding who gains what would otherwise be expended 
for filing costs, attorney's fees and trustee’s fees if the debtor files for 
bankruptcy.
9• The third enactment, the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, was in the
14
form of "borrowers' rights" for those borrowing from the Farm Credit System and 
the Farmers Home Administration. The concept of borrowers rights involves 
enforced debt restructuring along the. general lines of what had been.happening 
among many private lenders for at least 30 months.before enactment of the 
borrower's rights provisions in early 1988.
Better data and analysis needed
Another highly important lesson from the farm crisis of the 1980's was that 
accurate, up-to-date information on the financial condition of farmers is 
absolutely essential if the economic and financial condition of farmers is to be 
effectively monitored. While data were available on the aggregate amount of 
debt, no dependable data sources provided information on the distribution of that 
debt among farmers.
Vulnerability of agriculture to high interest rates
An important lesson to policymakers was that agriculture is highly 
vulnerable to high interest rates. With interest rates being a major mechanism 
for implementing monetary policy, this lesson is an important one.
Agriculture's vulnerability derives from the relatively high level of 
capital intensity in the sector and the relatively low rate of return on assets. 
That combination assures that agriculture is heavily impacted domestically by 
changes in the interest rate.
In addition, U.S. agriculture is export sensitive. With interest rates 
related to exchange rates, U.S. agriculture, as it was in the early 1980's,.can- 
be severely impacted domestically by a policy of tight credit and, at the same 
time, affected adversely in export markets with a rise in the value of the dollar 
against;other currencies.
Financial stress extended to advisors
A lesson learned painfully,in the.1980's is that financial stress for -
borrowers poses problems for attorneys, accountants, psychiatrists and other 
advisors at the very time when assistance was most needed. In the 1980's, 
decisions were often made on a base of far less than perfect knowledge because 
debtors simply did not feel they could afford, and in some instances did not have 
funds to employ, legal and tax advice needed to make rational decisions, for 
example. Likewise, the emotional strain of financial stress all too often was 
translated into family abuse, alcohol and drug problems and even suicide.
This development also meant that the mid 1980's were a highly stressful time 
for the attorneys and other professional advisors in rural areas who were willing 
to provide assistance, often at greatly reduced rates, to those most heavily 
indebted. Instances were noted of "burn out" among advisors after several months 
of intensive representation of debtors.
Attention should be given to the development of arrangements to assure 
needed professional assistance when funds are not available to pay for help. In 
the 1980’s, the total cost for such aid would have been relatively modest 
compared to the loan losses being incurred.
Basic family needs of debtors should be met
One of the most unfortunate aspects of high levels of debtor distress was 
the toll on the family. Indeed, many of the more touching stories published 
about the farm crisis of the 1980's related to impacts upon the family.
Greater recognition of the need for family assistance in terms of assuring 
the basic needs for survival (food, shelter, clothing, medical assistance), 
school costs and family counseling would be helpful. During the 1980's, these 
needs were met in some areas primarily by church, church-related and other 
private organizations. Even in those rural areas that were eventually served 
adequately by private groups, the lag in initiating assistance meant that some 
needs in the early months of the farm crisis simply were not met. In other rural
16
areas, relatively little assistance was provided.
As with the lesson related to the need for professional assistance, 
attention should be given to assuring adequate funding and staffing of outreach 
efforts and, at a minimum, organizing with a ..minimum of response time once the 
need is established.
Most states maintain offices for disaster assistance and relief. In 
general, those offices have been chartered to respond to physical disasters. A 
reorientation of charge and charter would provide the basic leadership and 
organization momentum which, in conjunction with extension services, mental 
health centers, church and church-related groups, should assure a faster response 
time in the future when economic disaster strikes. .
The United States has a long and proud tradition in responding generously to 
devastation from flood, fire, storms, earthquake and-other physical phenomena.
The objective should be to achieve the same level of response to economic 
disaster.
The hazards of non-diversity in loan portfolios
One of the most visible effects of the farm crisis of the 1980's —  and 
certainly the most important to policymakers in Washington —  was the impact on 
lenders. Indeed, had the farm crisis not posed a threat to the financial fabric 
of the country, through the aggregation of loans in the Farm Credit System, there 
would have been even less responsiveness from Washington.
The federal response a half century or so from now, at the time of the next 
farm crisis, might be even less forthcoming as the agricultural sector continues 
to diminish in relative importance in the country. Therefore, it seems prudent 
to take seriously the lesson of vulnerability from non-diversity in loan 
portfolios and develop a greater degree of built-in protection for the sector.
It is not at all clear that agriculture can count on the United States Treasury
17
to be the ultimate "rescue fund" in the future.
The problem of vulnerability has been the greatest in the Farm Credit 
System.10 Except for loans to farmer cooperatives, the system lends principally 
for agricultural purposes and takes as collateral principally agricultural 
property. Actually, loans to farmer cooperatives add relatively little diversity 
inasmuch as the fortunes of farmer cooperatives tend to parallel the fortunes of 
their farmer members.
Although the Farm Credit System's problems have been attributed also to 
farmer control and inept management, and those factors may have played a modest 
role, the overwhelming reason for the rapid financial deterioration of the system 
during the 1980's is believed to have been the concentration of loans m  the 
agricultural sector. -
Many rural—area banks also loan heavily to farmers. But even the smallest
rural-area bank generally has some loans to individuals and enterprises somewhat
insulated from the fortunes of agriculture.
The importance of paying some attention to the Farm Credit System's
condition relates to the degree of dominance of the system in agricultural
lending * In 1983, when outstanding farm debt totalled $216 billion, the Farm
Credit System had become the dominant farm lender in the United States. The
system held nearly 32 percent of the total farm debt in 1983, with Federal Land
Banks holding more than 43 percent of farm real estate debt. PCA's held almost
1223 percent of non-real estate debt before experiencing a decline in 1982. By
the end of 1985, those figures had decreased substantially, PCA's held 7.5
percent of the non-real estate debt while the Federal Land Bank's share of real
13estate lending had declined to 21 percent.
At the same time, the reserves of the Farm Credit System, including 
farmer-owned stock, had declined from $11.8 billion in 1984 (of which $6.2
18
billion was surplus) to $5.64 billion at the end of 1986, with system surplus
totalling only $1.45 billion on December 31, 1986.^  The condition of the system
continued to deteriorate through 1987 and into 1988 with financial assistance
15authorized in early 1988.
Concern about system vulnerability is not new. A 1952 report prepared by a 
committee chaired by a former governor of the Farm Credit Administration focused
1 fion the problem of PCA's sharing the risks of losses from large loans. The
governor of the Farm Credit Administration had tried, without success, to gain
support for changes to better enable the Production Credit Associations to
weather economic adversity. In its report, the committee stated —
Maside from the Government revolving fund, the production 
credit associations have no way of sharing risks nor recourse 
to any comparable assistance in times of stress. Under the 
present structure, each production credit association stands 
alone with respect to the risks of outstanding loans; there 
is no way now of spreading an association's risks beyond the 
limits of its territory. Because of the possibility of 
conditions which may be beyond the control of borrowers or 
the association arising in a particular territory, it is 
evident that individual associations could find themselves in 
an adverse financial condition beyond their ability to cope 
with."17
In a letter to W. G. Murray, a member of the committee, Gov. I.W. Duggan, who by
that time had left the Farm Credit Administration, stated:
"Your very nice letter brought forcibly to mind the fact that 
I had completely failed in making any progress in developing 
a program for operating the risks among PCA's. In fact, I 
even failed to convince those in the Production Credit System 
that they had any problems. Possibly, they will have to go 
through a wringing out process before they realize the 
situation..."
The Farm Credit Board, in 1966, approved risk-sharing plans in eight farm credit 
districts.18
One way to build protection for farm lenders against economic downturns is 
by increasing the level of diversity in loan portfolios.
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Diversity in farm lending can be achieved in various ways —
• Geographical diversity has been inherent in the national scope of the
Farm Credit System. There is, indeed, evidence that the original 12 Federal Land
19Bank districts were established to avoid "one-crop" districts. Geographic 
diversity has been helpful in enabling the system to withstand economic adversity 
related to weather, other natural disasters and localized price and income 
adversity. Indeed, geographic diversity was initially helpful in withstanding 
the effects of the farm crisis of the 1980's. However, healthier districts soon 
resisted the pooling of available reserves which limited the benefits of 
geographic diversity.
Under the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 a degree of geographic diversity
is retained with each bank responsible for obligations issued on its behalf and
jointly and severally with the other banks on consolidated or system-wide
20obligations as called upon by the Farm Credit Administration.
• Horizontal diversity could be achieved by lending to those whose economic 
fortunes are not related to agriculture,' If the Farm Credit System were .to move 
in this direction, the system would be virtually indistinguishable from other 
large, diversified lenders. Permission for such a broadening of lending 
authority is unlikely.
• Vertical diversity could be accomplished by lending to greater segments 
of the input supplying and output processing components of the agricultural 
sector. The value of vertical diversity relates to the extent to which the 
fortunes of borrowers in the expanded group move in cycles contrary to the 
fortunes of agriculture, rather than moving in tandem.
® Functional diversity could be achieved by adding an expanded line of 
financial and other products to the system. Long-range plans developed earlier 
in the 1980's by the Farm Credit System would have moved the system toward
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greater functional diversity. While the value of diversity, including functional 
diversity, would be significant, a question is raised as to whether there is 
adequate justification for governmentally-assisted creation of another large 
financial conglomerate. Again, permission for such a move seems unlikely.
• The remaining possibility for achieving diversity is to attain diversity 
over time. This involves building capital reserves in good economic times with 
the realization that the reserves will be utilized in times of economic adversity 
for the sector.
The creation of the Farm Credit System Insurance Corporation (FCSIC) which
is an FDIC-type fund for the Farm Credit System is a move in the direction of
21greater reliance on time diversity. Beginning five years after enactment of 
the legislation, the FCSIC is to insure the timely payment of principal and 
interest on obligations issued on behalf of the system. Each system bank, 
beginning in 1989, will pay an annual premium (0.15 percent on loans in accrual 
status, 0.25 percent on nonaccrual loans) on the average principal outstanding. 
The premiums will be scaled back when the FCSIC balance reaches two percent of 
all outstanding obligations or whatever amount is considered an actuarially sound 
amount. Considering the experience of the 1980's, an amount substantially in 
excess of two percent may be needed.
To the extent agricultural lenders cannot achieve diversity and cannot build 
sufficient reserves, problems can again be anticipated on the occasion of the 
next economic downturn for the sector. For the Farm Credit System, that means 
the U.S. Treasury will likely continue to play a back-up role, albeit more 
limited, hopefully, than in the 1980's.
The farm crisis was a "systems" problem for the entire rural community
An important lesson of the 1980's was that the farm crisis was not merely a 
debtors' problem or a lenders' problem. The farm crisis of the 1980's was a
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systems problem and soon touched virtually every segment of the rural community. 
Discharged debt went ricocheting through local communities, inflicting economic 
damage. Debt burdened farmers reduced their level of purchases, to the detriment 
of the merchants and professional people. Financially stressed farmers were 
unable to pay property taxes when due, thus impacting school districts and county 
government. Failed banks inflicted damage on all borrowers unable to obtain 
credit elsewhere and on the community if the bank closed. Thus, an attitude 
emerged of recognized interdependence which tended to curb the polarization of 
financially secure farmers on the one hand and heavily indebted farmers on the 
other.
The merits of prudence in lending
A lesson learned painfully by lenders (and learned in an equally painful 
manner by borrowers) in the 1980's was the importance of prudence in lending.
Much has been made of the shift by lenders from cash-flow lending to asset-based 
lending in the early 1970's, enabling greater amounts to be loaned. Likewise, 
much has been made of the relaxation of real estate lending limits in the Farm 
Credit Act of 1971. Without much doubt, both contributed to the lending 
practices which characterized the late 1970's and early 1980's. More important, 
however, was the attitude that success of an institution was measured by the 
growth in loans outstanding. The notion of "merchandising money" downplays the 
importance of prudence in lending.
It is fundamental that a dependable supply of capital is vital for the 
continued good health of the agricultural sector. It is equally fundamental that 
capital made available at bargain rates, other than as part of a narrowly 
targeted disaster relief program, does no favor for the sector. Low cost capital 
induces overproduction in the aggregate and encourages greater use of capital by 
individual farmers with the result of increased vulnerability to financial
22
distress.
The need for a team effort by USDA and the state universities
A lesson learned in the 1980's that should not have been necessary was the 
realization that the United States Department of Agriculture and the state 
universities should work as a team in endeavoring to solve agriculture's 
problems. All are funded with public moneys and it is reasonable for society to 
assume a modicum of cooperation and teamwork. Unfortunately, that was not the 
case in the 1980's.
It should be a high priority for the administrators involved to do whatever 
is necessary to assure that the pettiness and lack of cooperation that 
occasionally surfaced during the farm crisis of the 1980's are forever buried.
The importance of a reservoir of good will and support in the nonfarm sector
Finally, a lesson learned during the 1980's was that agriculture enjoys an 
enormous reservoir of good will among non-farm individuals in this country.
Foils and surveys repeatedly showed that a strong majority were highly supportive 
of efforts to provide economic assistance to heavily indebted farmers. Indeed, 
some surveys showed surprisingly strong support in terms of a willingness to pay 
additional taxes for that purpose.
This is a highly important and valuable resource that should be drawn upon 
only when needed and then in a responsible manner. If agriculture expects to 
maintain such support in the future, governmental assistance, whether for debt 
relief, drought relief or commodity price supports, must be rational, defensible 
and administered in a manner designed to maintain the confidence of the non-farm 
world. Moreover, it is incumbent upon agriculture to be supportive of needs 
important to the non-farm sector as a reciprocal gesture of good will and a 
reaffirmation that we are, indeed, one people.
There is a belief, deeply imbedded in the American culture, that a healthy
23
food producing system, organized around a family farm structure, is an important 
component of our food and agriculture policy. The experiences of the 1980's, as 
this country was confronted with a threat to the agrarian part of the culture, 
reaffirm the importance of that objective.
III. Conclusion
While the lessons of the 1980's are fresh in our minds, we should resolve to 
see that those lessons are transmitted to succeeding generations. Hopefully, if 
we are successful the level of trauma from economic disruptions in the sector in 
the twenty-first century will be lessened.
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